Some Examples of Contextuality in Physics: Implications to Quantum
  Cognition by de Barros, J. Acacio & Oas, Gary
SOME EXAMPLES OF CONTEXTUALITY IN PHYSICS:
IMPLICATIONS TO QUANTUM COGNITION
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Abstract. Contextuality, the impossibility of assigning a single random vari-
able to represent the outcomes of the same measurement procedure under
different experimental conditions, is a central aspect of quantum mechanics.
Thus defined, it appears in well-known cases in quantum mechanics, such as
the double-slit experiment, the Bell-EPR experiment, and the Kochen-Specker
theorem. Here we examine contextuality in such cases, and discuss how each
of them bring different conceptual issues when applied to quantum cognition.
We then focus on the shortcomings of using quantum probabilities to describe
social systems, and explain how negative quasi-probability distributions may
address such limitations.
1. Introduction
Contextuality is defined as the impossibility of assigning a single random variable
to represent the outcomes of a measurement under different experimental conditions
(thought of as contexts) [94, 73, 47, 43, 31]. More precisely, say you have a series
of experimental conditions where you measure a property P , whose outcome (out
of several runs) is represented by the random variable P. Imagine that, for one
of those conditions, P is measured together with other properties A1, A2, . . . , An
(whose outcomes are also represented by random variables A1,A2, . . . ,An), but
also imagine that, for another condition, P is measured with B1, B2, . . . , Bn′ , and
finally assume that it is not possible to create an experiment where all properties
P,A1, A2, . . . , An, B1, B2, . . . , Bn′ are measured simultaneously. Contextuality, as
defined informally above, is thus the impossibility of finding a probability space
(Ω,F , p) for P,A1, . . . ,An,B1, . . . ,Bn′ compatible with the distributions observed
experimentally.
As an example, take a simple situation where we have three properties X, Y ,
and Z corresponding to true or false statements. Observing such properties is
modeled by ±1-valued random variables, X, Y, and Z. Assume now that we only
observe two properties at a time, but never all three together. Assume additionally
that they are seen as perfectly anti-correlated to each other for each experimental
condition, i.e.
(1.1) E (XY) = E (XZ) = E (YZ) = −1.
Clearly no probability space giving those correlations exists, since a ω ∈ Ω giving
X (ω) = 1 implies, from the first and second expectations in (1.1), Y (ω) = −1 and
Z (ω) = −1, which contradicts the third expectation. However, if we relabel the
variables, in the spirit of References [86, 46, 45, 44, 47], making the fact that they
were measured in a pairwise way explicit, it is possible to construct a (Ω,F , p). For
instance, if we have a new set of random variables XY, XZ, YX, YZ, ZX, and ZY,
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such that correlations in (1.1) are now
(1.2) E (XYYX) = E (XZZX) = E (YZZY) = −1,
the sampling of an ω ∈ Ω leads to no contradictions. It is straightforward that
the contradiction from (1.1) comes from assuming that the value of, say, X when
measured with Y is the same as its value when measured with Z, i.e., it does not
depend on the experimental context provided by the simultaneous measurement of
the pairs.
Contextuality as defined here is ubiquitous in quantum mechanics, and may be at
the heart of what defines quantum systems, as opposed to classical ones (see [83] in
this volume). Examples of contextual quantum systems, some of them discussed in
more details in Section 2, are successive measurements of spin [53, 86], the double-
slit experiment [40], the Leggett-Garg experiment [76], the EPR-Bell experiment
[48, 18], and the Kochen-Specker system of observables [71]. So, it should come
as no surprise that the mathematical formalism developed to describe quantum
systems is suitable to describe (at least certain) contextual systems.
It is perhaps for this reason that such formalism was successfully applied to so-
cial systems with a certain degree of success [23, 59]. Social systems, because of
their contextuality, lack a joint probability distribution, and the contextual cal-
culus of probability of quantum mechanics seems to offer a suitable framework
for situations in which standard probability theory fails. For example, Savage’s
famous Sure-Thing-Principle (STP) [89], a consequence of classical probability the-
ory, are violated by human decision-makers [110, 93]. Khrennikov and Haven [69]
applied principles of quantum interference and showed that certain superpositions
of quantum-like states representing mental processes could be used to describe the
experimentally verified violation of STP.
So, it is possible the relationship between quantum mechanics, its formalism,
and social phenomena goes beyond a simple analogy, but points to a deeper rela-
tionship between the Hilbert space formalism and the description of determinate
contextual systems. However, arguments exist that certain social processes may not
be describable by the quantum formalism [26, 28, 30], but instead by other contex-
tual probability theories. Be that as it may, given the increasing importance of the
quantum formalism in the social sciences [67, 23, 59], we believe that a distinction
of the different quantum process that exhibit contextuality should be fruitful. Here
we analyze three different quantum systems that are contextual, and show that
each have contextuality that present different conceptual features.
This paper is organized the following way. First, in Section 2, we examine con-
textuality in quantum mechanics, starting with the famous double-slit experiment,
and then moving to the Bell-EPR experiment and the Kochen-Specker theorem. In
Section 3, we discuss contextuality in quantum cognition, and how it relates to the
examples discussed from physics. Finally, in Section 4 we present a particular al-
ternative model of extended probabilities that is suitable for some of the situations
discussed in quantum cognition.
2. Contextuality in QM
A fundamental question in physics is what makes quantum systems different
from classical ones (see our other contribution to this volume [83]). At the bottom
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of it seems to be the apparent impossibility of describing quantum systems in terms
of concepts from classical physics, such as particles and fields.
In the early days of the quantum revolution, physicists attempted to describe the
microscopic phenomena observed in terms of what we know nowadays as classical
ideas. But soon many realized that causality, one of the main tenets of classical
physics, was not compatible with the quantum world. For instance, Rutherford’s
radioactive decay formula was seen as corresponding to a memoryless Poissonian
process, and that therefore atoms who were about to decay had the same state as
those whose decay would happen much later. Subsequently, shortly after Bohr pub-
lished his theory explaining the spectrum of the Hydrogen atom, Rutherford himself
remarked that Bohr’s theory had a problem with causality [84]. Classical physics,
a causal theoretical structure with its description in terms of phase-space states
and Hamiltonian dynamics, was thought to not be able to account for what were
essentially probabilistic processes. As such, the unavoidable probabilistic character
of quantum mechanics became a topic of intense discussion and research.
Connected to this discussion was the idea that quantum probabilities could have
their origins in the impossibility of simultaneously observing two complementary
quantities, such as momentum and position of a particle. For instance, for Heisen-
berg, a measurement of position would cause a random disturbance on the momen-
tum in such a way that knowing the position of a particle at a time t0 would make
a prediction of its position at time t > t0 an impossible task. This perspective
evolved into a viewpoint some physicists put forth that two incompatible proper-
ties could not exist at the same time, brought about by the discovery of the spatial
quantization (spin).
To see this, imagine that spin is represented by a three-dimensional vector ran-
dom variable µ (ω) (here we follow [86]). If a measurement of spin, say, in the
direction zˆ, simply reveals the value of such random variable in such direction,
without disturbing it, then its result would be µ · zˆ, which experimentally can take
only values ±1 (here we use units where ~/2 = 1). However, there is nothing special
about the direction zˆ: the Stern-Gerlach (SG) apparatus measuring spin could be
pointing in any direction of our choice. Let us assume two other possible measure-
ment directions, eˆ1 and eˆ2, such that they are each at 120 degrees from each other,
i.e.
(2.1) zˆ + eˆ1 + eˆ2 = 0.
Since any direction of the SG apparatus will result in quantized spin (we assume
the source is a proper mixture), we have at once that µ · zˆ, µ · eˆ1, and µ · eˆ2 have
values ±1. But
(2.2) µ (ω) · zˆ + µ (ω) · eˆ1 + µ (ω) · eˆ2 = µ · (zˆ + eˆ1 + eˆ2) ,
and we reach an apparent contradiction, since the left hand side can only take
values ±3,±1 but the right hand side is zero because of (2.1). It is clear that the
contradiction comes from the assumption that the ω for each experiment (for the
three different directions) is the same, since this is what is required to go from the
left to the right hand side of (2.2). Thus, if we assume that spin µ (ω) exists before
the measurement, the act of measuring it in one direction, say xˆ, changes it to a
new µ (ω), and the process of measurement does not “reveal” the actual state, but
instead changes it to a new state with different properties from the original one.
The relationship between µ and ω ∈ Ω can be thought as a hidden variable theory
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Figure 2.1. Double-slit experiment. A source on the left sends
light onto a barrier with two slits cut close to each other. An
interference pattern appears on the screen to the right.
of the outcomes of spin, using the terminology of physics [15], and the dependency
of ω on the experimental setup makes this theory contextual. So, even in the simple
case of having consecutive measurements of spin, we see the impossibility of treating
outcomes of experiments as context-independent.
But perhaps the best-known example of contextuality (again, in the sense used
above) in quantum mechanics is the famous double-slit experiment [40]. In classical
physics, the double-slit experiment, attributed to Thomas Young [19], was used to
demonstrate interference, thus “falsifying” the corpuscular theory of Newton and
supporting the wave theory of light. In it, light impinges on a barrier where two
small and parallel slits are cut, allowing a small amount of the light to go through
and reach a screen at the other side (see Figure 2.1). Because of its wave character,
an interference pattern emerges at the screen, due to differences of phase at each
screen location in a way consistent with the geometry of the setup. This interference
pattern seems to be incompatible with the Newtonian particle theory of light, since
particles arriving at a point on the screen did not interact with both slits, and
therefore a concept of phase difference for particles would be meaningless.
In its quantum mechanical version, the double slit needs to be examined in a
new light (no pun intended). As is well-known, Einstein used the notion that light
was made of particles to explain the photo-electric effect, and evidenced mounted
in the early days that light was actually made of particles, called photons [84]. But
if light is made of particles, what should we conclude from Young’s experiment?
An initial hypothesis was that interference was a collective effect of many photons,
similar to sound waves being a collective effect of many atoms. However, this idea
showed to be inconsistent with experiments where the light intensity was so low that
effectively only one photon at a time was present between the slits and the screen
(or photographic plate, in this case). So, photons seem to present self-interference,
a quite mysterious property. In fact, in his famous Lectures on Physics, Richard
Feynman stated that the double-slit experiment contained the “only mystery” of
quantum mechanics [50].
To see how the double-slit experiment provides contextuality, let us examine it
in a simplified version. In the double-slit experiment, photons are detected on a
screen, thus providing a continuum of locations, with a corresponding complicated
mathematical description (see [102, 105] and references therein). But what makes
the double slit mysterious to Feynman are interference effects, and interference
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Figure 2.2. Mach Zehnder Interferometer (MZI). A light source
S sends a light beam that impinges on the first beam splitter BS.
The beam is them divided by BS into equal-intensity beams that
travel to both arms (paths) A and B of the interferometer, reflect-
ing on mirrors MA and MB , respectively. The beams from arms
A and B are then recombined in the second beam splitter. The
outcomes are the two beams detected at D1 and D2.
can be studied without resorting to such continuum, in a setup called the Mach-
Zehnder interferometer (MZI). So, here we analyze in more detail the contextuality
of quantum systems in the MZI.
In the MZI, a light source is directed toward a beam splitter that divides the beam
into two distinct beams of equal intensity (see Figure 2.2). Beam splitters have the
important characteristic that light beams reflected by them are phase-shifted by
pi/2, whereas the beam’s phase going through is not affected, and therefore a pi/2
phase difference exists between beams in arm A and B of Figure 2.2. After the
first beam splitter, some mirrors redirect the beams to another beam splitter, and
the beams are recombined, adding once again a pi/2 phase to the reflected beam.
Mathematically, we can describe each beam impinging on the second BS with a
sine function
ψA =
A
2
sinωt,
ψB =
A
2
sin
(
ωt+
pi
2
)
=
A
2
cosωt,
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where A is the amplitude of the source S and ω its frequency. After the second
beam splitter, we have
ψD1 =
A
2
sin
(
ωt+
pi
2
)
+
A
2
cosωt
= A,
ψD2 =
A
2
sinωt+
A
2
cos
(
ωt+
pi
2
)
= 0.
We then see the main characteristic of the MZI: interference effects give a zero
amplitude at D1 and amplitude A at D2. We remark that there is an underlying
assumption in our derivation above, namely that the length of the interferometer
arms A and B were exactly the same. Were they any different, and the phase
relations would not match exactly, interference would not be perfect as above (with
0 and A amplitudes)1.
The above description is the classical one for light waves. But what happens if
we have classical (non-quantum) particles in a similar setup to the MZI? Imagine
we send one particle at a time through the MZI. Since no concept of phase or phase
relation exists for a classical particle, the first beam splitter would simply reflect
it to A or B, with probability 1/2 to go to A and 1/2 to B. Once in the second
beam splitter, the particle (coming from either A or B) would be randomly sent
to either detector. Thus, for classical particles we should expect probability 1/2 of
observing the particle in D1 or D2 (but never on both detectors!).
Now, what to make of the MZI for quantum particles? If we send a single
photon through a MZI, a photodetector placed on either arm of it will reveal the
characteristic of a particle: a click on either A or B, but never both. Furthermore,
if a photodetector is placed on either A or B, the outcomes of a measurement on
D1 and D2 are exactly what we expect from a particle: the photon shows up on
each of those detectors with probability 1/2. However, if no detectors are placed
on A or B, the photon shows zero probability of detection on D2 and probability 1
on D1. In other words, in the absence of detectors on A or B, the photon behaves
as if it were a wave, carrying information about the relative phases of the MZI’s
geometry.
The disturbing aspects of this wave/particle duality for photons has been dis-
cussed at length for almost one hundred years, and the interested readers are re-
ferred to the many excellent sources (we can particularly recommend the historical
account found in Abraham Pais’s volume [84]). Here we focus only on the contex-
tual aspects of it. To see them, we start with two ±1-valued random variables, P
and D, representing the which-path information and detection, respectively. P is
defined such that P = 1 if the particle is detected on A and −1 otherwise, whereas
D is defined such that D = 1 if the photon was detected in D1 and −1 if detected
in D2.
We have for the MZI two different experimental conditions: one in which no
detector is placed on A or B and another where a detector is placed on either A
or B (or both), thus yielding which-path information encoded in the outcomes of
P. Measuring D under the no-which-path condition results in E (D) = 1, whereas
measuring it together with P gives as marginal expectation the result E (D) = 0.
1That is why interferometers are very useful for measuring distances accurately.
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A A' B B'
Alice BobSource
Figure 2.3. Bell-EPR experiment. A source emits two photons,
one toward Alice’s lab and another toward Bob’s. Each experi-
menter can make a decision on which direction of spin to measure,
represented in the figure by the settings A and A′ for Alice and B
and B′ for Bob. Outcomes of measurements are ±1, with equal
probabilities.
Thus, according to the above definition of contextuality, the random variable D is
contextual2.
The double-slit experiment provides a dramatic type of contextuality, but it is
not as surprising as Feynman makes it seem. In fact, not only can we “solve” the
mystery of quantum mechanics for this case, if we were to accept a (contextual)
hidden-variable theory such as Bohm’s [16, 17]3, but we can also clearly understand
the possibility of a direct influence from P to D. In fact, that is exactly what
Heisenberg tried to do with his analysis of the wave/particle duality in the double-
slit experiment by using what is now known as the Heisenberg microscope [60].
Thus, even though it has at its core one of the main characteristics of QM, i.e. the
interference of particles, it is far from containing its only mystery.
Perhaps a deeper mystery comes from a variation in the experiment proposed
by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen’s seminal 1935 paper on the completeness of
quantum mechanics [48], now simply known as EPR. In Bohm’s version of the
EPR argument [18], two correlated photons4 in the state
(2.3) |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|+ +〉+ | − −〉) ,
where | + +〉 corresponds to the state where both photons have vertical polariza-
tion and | − −〉 horizontal, are sent in two different directions. In one direction,
an experimenter, Alice, chooses whether to measure the linear polarization of the
photon or not, and if she does, she either observes + or − (see Figure 2.3). In the
other direction, Bob can also measure polarization in the same direction as Alice.
However, if Alice already did, Bob does not need to, because if Alice measures
− Bob knows for sure that the photon getting to him will also be − (due to the
correlations contained in the state (2.3)).
Up to now there is no mystery from the correlated outcomes of Alice and Bob.
What we know is that for state (2.3) the outcomes of experiments for Alice are
2Dzhafarov and Kujala refer to this type of strong contextuality as direct influences, meaning
that the measurement of P directly influences the outcomes of random variable D [45, 44]. They,
on the other hand, reserve the label contextual to refer to other cases where the influences of P
over D cannot be accounted for by direct influences.
3Such hidden variable theory provides a mechanism that accounts for the experimental out-
comes of the double-slit experiment. As expected, Bohm’s theory cited here is a contextual theory,
in the sense that the hidden variable needs to be context-dependent.
4Bohm’s version actually used spin 1/2 particles, not photons, but for our purposes we can use
photons.
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the same as for Bob’s. But that, according to EPR, presents a problem for QM,
since Alice and Bob can perform their measurements as far away from each other
as possible. If they do, argue EPR, then it is possible to determine the value of
the spin for Bob’s particle, say, without ever affecting its state, since all we need
to do is use Alice’s value. Alice’s measurement does not affect the state at Bob’s
because special relativity forbids faster-than-light interactions. So, continue EPR,
the values of the polarization for both particles must come from some state of the
system that is not represented in |ψ〉, and therefore the QM description of nature
is incomplete.
A theory that completes QM, in the sense given by EPR, is called a hidden-
variable theory, and it so happens that (local) hidden-variable theories are not
compatible with the predictions of QM. The first person to point out an empirical
incompatibility between QM and (local) hidden variable theories was John Bell.
In a seminal paper [14], Bell derived a set of inequalities that were necessary for
local hidden variable theories, and proceeded to show that for certain quantum
states those inequalities were violated. More than a decade later, Aspect, Grangier,
and Ge´rard [11] showed, in a tour de force experiment where for the first time
correlations between spacelike separated events were recorded, that the quantum
mechanical predictions were correct.
To understand Bell’s results, let us examine the setup he discussed. It can be
shown that a hidden-variable λ explaining the experimental outcomes of polariza-
tion for Alice and Bob exists if and only if a joint probability distribution exits
for all possible outcomes [107, 106]. To show that a hidden-variable theory is not
compatible with QM, we need to show an QM example that does not allow a joint
probability distribution. However, this setup needs to have some constraints, since
we saw that the double-slit experiment does not have a joint probability but is
also compatible with a (contextual) hidden-variable theory. A suggestion for this
constraint is present in EPR’s example: the outcomes of a variable A cannot be
(superluminally) influenced by what happens at another far away location. In other
words, from EPR’s point of view relativity theory is incompatible with events that
are contextual and spacelike separated.
We now proceed to show Bell’s argument and setup. Imagine that we have
now two possible experimental (and incompatible) measurements of polarization
for Alice in two different directions, and the same for Bob (not necessarily the same
directions as Alice). Let us represent the outcomes of measurements with ±1-valued
random variables, namely A and A′ for both of Alice’s directions, and B and B′
for Bob’s (see Figure 2.3). We can construct a random variable S defined simply
by
(2.4) S = AB + A′B + AB′ −A′B′.
If a joint probability exists, for each ω ∈ Ω there are associated outcomes for A, A′,
B, and B′ and a corresponding probability. Since A, A′, B, and B′ are ±1-valued
random variables, it follows that for all possible combinations of values for A, A′,
B, and B′ the value of S is either 2 or −2 (for example, if A = 1, A′ = −1, B = −1,
and B′ = 1, then S = −1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 2). Therefore, the expected value of S must
be a number between −2 and 2, i.e.
(2.5) − 2 ≤ 〈AB〉+ 〈A′B〉+ 〈AB′〉 − 〈A′B′〉 ≤ 2.
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This inequality is one of the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequalities [25]
(the others are obtained simply by moving the “−” sign in (2.4) to other terms),
and a joint probability distribution exits if and only if they are satisfied [51]. It
is possible to show that, for a proper choice of angles of measurement for Alice
and Bob, their observed correlations result in an 〈S〉 = 2√2, which violates (2.5).
Therefore, no joint probability distribution exists, and as consequence, no hidden-
variable theory exists that explains the correlations between the observables. Fur-
thermore, because no joint exists, the assumption that an A under experimental
condition where it is measured together with B (as in 〈AB〉) is the same as when
it is measured with B′ is not correct: the system A, A′, B, and B′ is contextual.
It is hard to overplay the importance of Bell’s results. For example, Henry
Stapp famously stated it to be “the most profound discovery of science” [96]. The
reason is that Bell’s theorem clearly shows that far away measurements indeed
affect the outcomes of a nearby measurement for entangled systems. In other words,
quantum mechanics is non-local, which seems to be incompatible with the principles
behind relativity [78]. Furthermore, both quantum mechanics and relativity are
tremendously successful theories, from an empirical point of view.
As we saw, Bell’s setup differs significantly from the double-slit experiment.
First, it does not allow for direct influences between the observable quantities, which
if allowed would be in direct conflict with special relativity. Instead, the absence of
a joint probability distribution (and therefore of a non-contextual hidden-variable
theory) comes from the non-trivial correlations imposed by QM (and experimental
observations). But, more importantly, Bell’s setup provides a case where a system
with two (or more) parts can have such non-trivial correlations even when the
measurements of those parts are spacelike separated.
We end this section with one last example of contextuality, the Kochen-Specker
paradigm [71]. In quantum mechanics, projection operators5 constitute the “sim-
plest” type of measurement possible. For example, for a spin 1/2 particle, its
Hilbert space is two dimensional. In this Hilbert space, the projector Pz = |+〉〈+|
is an observable with eigenvalues 0 and 1, corresponding to not having and having
the property “spin + in direction zˆ.” So, projection operators correspond to mea-
surements whose outcomes tell you whether the system has the property measured
(0) or not (1).
In their paper, Kochen and Specker asked whether it is possible to assign val-
ues 0 or 1 to projection operators in a way that is consistent. To show that this
is not possible, they used a Hilbert space of dimension three and a total of 117
projectors. However, to understand how their results come about, we show here a
simpler version of 18 projectors in a four dimensional Hilbert space, due to Cabello,
Estebaranz, and Alcaine [24]. In this version, we have the set of projection oper-
ators Pi with corresponding dicotomic random variables Vi taking values 0 or 1
depending on whether the property is false or true6. The index i in Pi corresponds
to a vector in the four dimensional space where Pi projects onto. Below is a list of
combinations of random variables, and we see that each line corresponds to a set
5A Hermitian operator P is a projection operator if P 2 = P .
6Technically, it is not necessary to use random variables, since the Kochen-Specker example
uses deterministic (probability one) events. The use of random variables extends this setup to
more realistic situations, where probability one events are never observed [74, 36].
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of projectors that commute, and can therefore be measured simultaneously, though
this is not true for projectors in different lines.
V0,0,0,1 + V0,0,1,0 + V1,1,0,0 + V1,−1,0,0 = 1,
V0,0,0,1 + V0,1,0,0 + V1,0,1,0 + V1,0,−1,0 = 1,
V1,−1,1,−1 + V1,−1,−1,1 + V1,1,0,0 + V0,0,1,1 = 1,
V1,−1,1,−1 + V1,1,1,1 + V1,0,−1,0 + V0,1,0,−1 = 1,
V0,0,1,0 + V0,1,0,0 + V1,0,0,1 + V1,0,0,−1 = 1,
V1,−1,−1,1 + V1,1,1,1 + V1,0,0,−1 + V0,1,−1,0 = 1,
V1,1,−1,1 + V1,1,1,−1 + V1,−1,0,0 + V0,0,1,1 = 1,
V1,1,−1,1 + V−1,1,1,1 + V1,0,1,0 + V0,1,0,−1 = 1,
V1,1,1,−1 + V−1,1,1,1 + V1,0,0,1 + V0,1,−1,0 = 1.
Now, since Vi is either 0 or 1, we can sum all the random variables on the left hand
side of the previous set of equations, and because each random variable appears
exactly twice, this must be an even number. However, because we have only 9
equations, the sum of the right hand side yields an odd number. This is clearly
a contradiction, and as with the spin case at the beginning, the problem comes
from identifying a random variable (say, V0,0,0,1) in a given experimental context
(say, when measured together with V0,0,1,0, V1,1,0,0, V1,−1,0,0, as in line one) with
the same variable in a different experimental context (in our example, V0,1,0,0,
V1,0,1,0, V1,0,−1,0, as in line two). In other words, the Kochen-Specker theorem
shows that the algebra of observables in QM is such that it is impossible to assign
non-contextual values to certain properties of a system, independent of what the
system is.
To summarize, in this section we presented several different examples of con-
textual quantum systems, per our definition of contextuality. We see that each
example presents its own subtle issues. In the double-slit experiment, contextual-
ity comes mainly from direct influences on the detection random variable due to
a measurement that leads to which-path information7. The direct influence arises
from the choice of successively measuring incompatible observables, D and P . In
one case, observable D is measured first (i.e., without P ), and the wave function
arriving to it leads to interference. In the other case, P is measured first, collapsing
the wave function, and leading to a different quantum state reaching D. So, P di-
rectly influences D. To distinguish it from the other cases, we call this contextuality
by direct influences.
In the Bell-EPR experiment, direct influences are forbidden by special relativ-
ity, and are not observed. Because two observables, say A and B′, commute, the
changes to the wave function made by A do not affect the outcomes of B′. However,
the correlations between A and B′ are affected by their simultaneous measurement.
So, the most striking feature of Bell’s setup was the contextual dependency of out-
comes of experiments in systems that are spacelike separated, suggesting some type
of superluminal influence [78], or, as Einstein called it, “spukhafte Fernwirkung”
7Though direct influences may not account for the totality of contextual effects. See [13] for an
example in the context of the Leggett-Garg experiment, which is formally related to the double-slit
experiment.
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(spooky action at a distance). The contextuality for observables that are spacelike
separated are called nonlocal contextuality, or simply nonlocality .
Finally, the Kochen-Specker theorem showed that the algebra of observables
is such that the random variables representing the outcomes of any state of a
measurable experimental system will present contextuality. This is a fact that comes
simply from the observables themselves and, contrary to the Bell-EPR experiment,
which requires an entangled state, has nothing to do with the state of the system
being measured (i.e., is state independent). Consistently with the physics literature,
we refer to this as state-independent contextuality or simply contextuality.
We emphasize that all the physical systems discussed here satisfy the criteria
of contextuality put forth in the Introduction. From a device independent frame-
work [90, 21], where experiments involve black boxes with local inputs (settings
for a measurement) and outputs (measurement outcomes), we look only at ran-
dom variables. Then, in this framework, the two types of contextuality would be
contextuality by direct influences and contextuality not by direct influences. So,
the double-slit experiment would fall into the category of contextuality by direct
influences, whereas both Bell-EPR and Kochen-Specker would be contextual not
by direct influences. The distinction between Bell-EPR and Kochen-Specker (i.e.,
local vs. nonlocal, state-dependent vs. state-independent) is based on physical
principles, and not on probabilistic principles alone.
We saw that exemplary physical systems exhibit contextuality, but from a phys-
ical point of view their contextuality is different. This leads to the definition of at
least three types of contextuality: contextuality by direct influences, non-locality,
and state-independent contextuality. In the next section we examine quantum cog-
nition, and discuss how quantum contextuality shows up in them.
3. Contextuality in quantum cognition
In this section we will examine some examples from the burgeoning field of
quantum cognition. Quantum cognition is the use of the mathematical formalism
of quantum mechanics to model cognitive processes. As such, it should not be
confused with the idea that in order to describe cognition (or consciousness) we need
to use quantum mechanics, as is espoused by Penrose and Hammerof [85, 56, 55],
or by Stapp [97, 98, 99, 29], among others. To researchers in quantum cognition,
the quantum comes from the use of the contextual probability theory given by the
Hilbert space formalism to describe cognitive systems, but the underlying processes
that govern it can be classical [64, 68, 27].
This section is not intended to be an exhaustive review of this field, but instead
to provide an example to illustrate some of the main features of quantum cognition
models. Quantum models were used to model the conjunction and disjunction
paradoxes [3, 87, 52, 66], the Ellsberg paradox [69, 6, 8], order effects [109, 12, 113],
similarity effects [115], and the Guppy effect [4, 5], to name a few. The interested
reader is referred to many of the useful reviews on the subject, such as Khrennikov
[67], Busemeyer and Bruza [23], Khrennikov and Haven [59], and Ashtiani and
Azgomi [10].
We focus on one of the first applications of the quantum formalism, the modeling
of the violation of Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle (STP). Simply put, Savage’s STP
states that if a person holds the subjective view that A is preferred over ¬A if B
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is true8, but is also preferred if B is false, then A should be preferred regardless of
whether the person knows which is true, B or ¬B. In Savage’s own words [89, pg.
21], “A businessman contemplates buying a certain piece of property. He considers
the outcome of the next presidential election relevant to the attractiveness of the
purchase. So, to clarify the matter for himself, he asks whether he should buy if he
knew that the Republican candidate were going to win, and decides that he would
do so. Similarly, he considers whether he would buy if he knew that the Democratic
candidate were going to win, and again finds that he would do so. Seeing that he
would buy in either event, he decides that he should buy, even though he does
not know which event obtains, or will obtain, as we would ordinarily say. It is
all too seldom that a decision can be arrived at on the basis of the principle used
by this businessman, but, except possibly for the assumption of simple ordering,
I know of no other extralogical principle governing decisions that finds such ready
acceptance.” Formally, let us imagine a ±1-valued random variable A (A = 1
is buy and A = −1 is not buy), and let another ±1-valued variable B be 1 if a
Democrat wins −1 if a Republican wins. If A = 1 is preferred over A = −1 when
B = 1 and also when B = −1, then A = 1 is always preferred.
Even though most people would agree with Savage that his principle “finds
such ready acceptance,” in some experimental conditions, human decision makers
violate it. For example, in Tversky and Shafir’s 1992 paper [110], participants
were told about a two-step gamble. In the first step, which was compulsory for all
players, there was a 50/50 probability of winning $200 or loosing $100. The second
step was not compulsory, and the person could choose whether or not to make a
second gamble with the same odds and payoffs. After winning the first bet, 69%
of participants chose to place a second gamble, and after loosing 59% also chose to
gamble a second time. In terms of probabilities, we have
P (“gamble again”|“won”) = 0.69 > P (“not gamble again”|“won”) = 0.31,
P (“gamble again”|“lost”) = 0.59 > P (“not gamble again”|“lost”) = 0.41.
Since “gamble again” is preferred over “not gamble again” for both situations,
“won” or “lost” the first step, STP tells us that “gamble again” should be preferred
over “not gamble again.” However, in a later time, the same participants were asked
about the second gamble, but this time they were not told whether they won or
lost the first step. Under this unknown condition, 64% of the participants rejected
the second gamble. But this corresponds to
P (“gamble again”) = 0.36 < P (“not gamble again”) = 0.64,
a clear violation of the STP.
Violations of STP are violations of the standard calculus of probability. To see
this, imagine you have two sets, A and B, and we define the conditional probability
of A given B as
P (A|B) = P (A ∩B)
P (B)
,
for P (B) 6= 0. In this notation, the STP conditions are equivalent to
(3.1) P (A ∩B) > P (A ∩B) , P (A ∩B) > P (A ∩B) ,
8The notation ¬A means “not A.”
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where A denotes the complement of A. But from the calculus of probability,
P (A ∩B) + P (A ∩B) = P (A)
and
P
(
A ∩B)+ P (A ∩B) = P (A) ,
and adding each term in (3.1) we obtain
P (A) > P
(
A
)
.
Notice that the violation of the law of probabilities happens because we assume
there is a joint probability distribution for A and B, which of course in this case
is clear there should be, since we are dealing with the conditional probability of A
given B as something given subjectively by the decision maker.
How can we model such violations of classical probability theory with a quantum
formalism? The answer to this particular case is given by the quantum description
of the double-slit experiment [66, 4, 69] in the MZI paradigm. In the MZI, let us
have the statement “detector D1 is preferred over D2” as corresponding to a higher
probability of detecting a particle in D1 instead of D2. In the notation of Section
2, this corresponds to
(3.2) p (D = 1) > p (D = −1) .
The which-path information is given by P, and for the MZI we have
p (D = 1|P = 1) = p (D = −1|P = 1)
= p (D = 1|P = −1)
= p (D = −1|P = −1)
=
1
2
.
Similarly to violations of STP, because of the symmetry of the probabilities9, we
have no reason to prefer D = 1 over D = −1 or vice versa, as from the symmetry
and classical probability theory we have that p (D = 1) = p (D = −1), in disagree-
ment with (3.2). So, to model a violation of STP for human decision makers, all we
need to do is map the MZI, with responses “gamble again” or “not gamble again”
corresponding to D = 1 and D = −1, and which path information corresponding
to “won” or “lost.” The “won” and “lost” intermediate states are though as men-
tal states that “collapse” once the decision maker becomes knowledgeable of the
outcome of the first gamble.
We remark that, as far as we know, all the quantum cognition models have
similar characteristics to the MZI. What we mean by this is the following. In
the MZI the violation of classical probability theory comes from two incompatible
sets of experimental data due to different contexts. In one context, which-path
information is not present, and the quantum state reaching detectors D1 and D2
is in a superposition with components from both paths. In the other context,
a which-path measurement is performed, and the wave function collapses, with a
corresponding loss of quantum superposition. So, differences in probabilities usually
come from collapse/no-collapse of the wave function due to a measurement.
9This symmetry is not necessary, and we put it here to make the argument simpler and to
have a direct connection to the experimental setup shown in Section 2. The MZI can be modified
to introduce biases that would make the probabilistic system non-symmetric, but would still lead
to a violation of STP (using the same mapping as we have here).
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Some researchers have suggested that other quantum-like effects may exist in
cognitive systems, such as entanglement [4, 22, 7]. Entanglement comes from states
such as (2.3), where for N -partite systems (N ≥ 2), the outcomes of a property of
a subsystem are connected to another property of another subsystem in a way that
cannot be explained by common causes (i.e., hidden variables), as it was the case
with the Bell-EPR setup. We have argued elsewhere that, because we cannot rule
out other physical mechanisms, such types of entanglement are not as unexpected as
the quantum mechanical ones [38], and in fact can be derived by classical-like models
[27]. Exactly because of this reason, there are no principles denying violations
of the no-signaling condition (corresponding to direct influences between different
subsystems), as we have in actual quantum systems [82]. Furthermore, it seems
that most of the cases of violations of inequalities such as (2.5) also violate a form
of the no-signaling condition, and no contextuality from entanglement is detectable,
suggesting that direct influences are more important in quantum cognition [42].
We can also emphasize that, in quantum cognition, violations of the CHSH in-
equalities do not necessarily mean nonlocality. To demonstrate non-locality, one
needs to not only show violations of the CHSH of events that are spacelike separated
(a seemingly impossible task for cognitive events), but also that such violations are
not subject to standard loopholes [75]. To see how difficult this task is, attempts to
create a loophole free test of nonlocality for quantum systems have yet to be success-
ful, even after many decades of intensive research [100]. One can only imagine the
technical and conceptual difficulties that would make it hopeless to show nonlocal-
ity for cognitive systems. Other difficulties are also present in the Kochen-Specker
system [70]. So, from an empirical point of view, it seems that the predominant
“quantum” effect in cognition is related to the MZI.
Let us end this Section with one important example. To motivate it, let us
recall that quantum cognition relies on using the quantum mechanical mathemati-
cal apparatus to social systems. However, this seems too constraining, leaving out
many situations that would not be describable by the formalism. As an exam-
ple, mentioned in the previous paragraph, there are no reasons to require cognitive
systems to satisfy the no-signaling condition, and we even have evidence that it
is violated for some cognitive systems. However, the no-signaling condition is a
direct consequence of the quantum formalism: we can derive it from the structure
of the Hilbert space. Furthermore, other forms of “superluminal” communications
are strictly forbidden by quantum mechanics. This is the case with the no-cloning
theorem [39]; if cloning were possible, one could devise a method of sending commu-
nications between Alice and Bob in the EPR setup discussed above. But we have
no a priori reason to rule out state cloning for social systems. So, is the quantum
mechanical apparatus too constraining?
As a toy example, we refer back to the ±1-valued random variables, X, Y, and
Z, discussed in the Introduction. It is possible to concoct artificial (but reason-
able) cases where those random variables have no joint probability distribution,
presenting contextuality [28]. Furthermore, it is also possible to show that, under
reasonable assumptions, neural models that lead to similar outcomes described by
quantum mechanics [27, 32, 103], may also generate correlated variables X, Y, and
Z that have no joint [26, 30]. However, such simple example cannot be described
by quantum mechanics (unless we create a contrived model of it [28]), since the
existence of observed correlations corresponds to pairwise commutations between
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the quantum operators representing X, Y, and Z, and from the algebra of opera-
tors it follows that all three variables X, Y, and Z are simultaneously observable.
Since they are all simultaneously observable, a joint probability distribution must
exist. So, the quantum formalism rules out situations such as those described in
[26, 28, 30]10.
To summarize, we sketched in this section how the formalism of quantum me-
chanics is often used in quantum cognition. We claimed that among the many
different cases where contextuality shows up in quantum mechanics, it seems that
the only relevant case may be the double-slit experiment. We also saw that the
quantum formalism may present too many restrictions to certain contextual sit-
uations. In the next section, we discuss an alternative formalism that we have
proposed in previous papers: negative probabilities.
4. Describing contextual probabilities
We saw that contextuality is a key factor in quantum cognition, and the main
push for using the quantum mechanical mathematical apparatus was the better fit
it provided for certain experiments. This should not come too much as a surprise,
as this apparatus was developed to deal with systems that are contextual, such
as the double-slit experiment. But we also saw that there may be cases where
quantum mechanics imposes too many restrictions that would make its Hilbert
space formalism inadequate to represent them. So, the question is how to develop a
theory of probabilities that have the same ability to describe contextual systems as
quantum mechanics, but also has the flexibility of describing the systems discussed
above.
There are many attempts to describe quantum contextual systems, such as con-
textuality by default[45, 47, 46] or upper and lower probabilities [37, 58, 61, 104].
Here we present a possible theory, first appearing in Physics in the works of Wigner
[114], but later on considered more seriously by Dirac [41] and Feynman [49] (for a
historical but not up-to-date survey of negative probabilities in physics, the reader
is referred to [81]).
As mentioned, negative probabilities showed up in quantum mechanics, when
Wigner asked which joint probability distributions for momentum and position
would result in the same outcomes predicted by quantum statistical mechanics
[114]. When such joint probability distributions were computed for some physi-
cal systems (see, e.g. [101]), it became clear that they could take negative values,
and were therefore discarded as non-physical probabilities (Wigner called them
quasi-probability distributions). Though agreeing with Wigner’s claim of no phys-
ical meaning, Dirac thought negative probabilities could be as useful as negative
numbers were in mathematics, and attempted to apply them to the description of
quantized fields [41], with no success. Decades later, Feynman also tried to use
negative probabilities, but, to his disappointment, thought that they did not of-
fer any new insights or results in quantum-field theory [49]. However, since then,
some researchers have been using negative probabilities to help understand certain
physical systems, mainly when violations of classical probabilities occur because of
contextuality [91, 95, 57, 1, 112, 9, 54, 111, 116, 2, 82, 20, 77].
10For a more detailed discussion of the neural model and its connection to quantum cognition
and to the issues mentioned in this paragraph, the reader is referred to [34].
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Let us start by defining negative probabilities (we follow [35, 34]). We start with
a preliminary definition.
Definition 1 (compatibility). Let Ω be a finite set, F an algebra over Ω, and let
(Ωi,Fi, pi), i = 1, . . . , n, a set of n probability spaces, Fi ⊆ F and Ωi ⊆ Ω. Then
(Ω,F , p),where p is a real-valued function, p : F → [0, 1], p (Ω) = 1, is compatible
with the probabilities pi’s iff
∀ (x ∈ Fi) (pi (x) = p (x)) .
The marginals pi are called viable iff p is a probability measure.
The idea of the previous definition is that for contextual systems, our observa-
tions are always in subspaces of a larger sample space Ω. If it is not possible to put
all the observed marginals in those systems in a single space, then the marginals
are not viable11, i.e. there does not exists a joint probability distribution over Ω
that explains all correlations.
In QM (and, perhaps, social sciences), the marginals are not always viable. This
means that no proper joint probability distribution exists, but perhaps a real-valued
function (but sometimes negative) p exists that provides all the correct marginals.
This p, if normalized, would be a negative probability.
Definition 2 (negative probabilities). Let Ω be a finite set, F an algebra over
Ω, P and P ′ real-valued functions, P : F → R, P ′ : F → R, and let (Ωi,Fi, pi),
i = 1, . . . , n, a set of n probability spaces, Fi ⊂ F and Ωi ⊆ Ω. Then (Ω,F , P ) is
a negative probability space, and P a negative probability, if and only if (Ω,F , P )
is compatible with the probabilities pi’s and
N1. ∀ (P ′)
(∑
ωi∈Ω
|P ({ωi})| ≤
∑
ωi∈Ω
|P ′ ({ωi})|
)
N2.
∑
ωi∈Ω
P ({ωi}) = 1
N3. P ({ωi, ωj}) = P ({ωi}) + P ({ωj}) , i 6= j.
In the above definition, the standard axiom of nonnegativity [72] is replaced
with a minimization of the L1 norm of P (we use P for negative joint probability
distributions, and p for proper probability distributions). Intuitively, we minimize
the L1 norm to find a quasi-probability distribution that is as close as possible
to a proper probability distribution, since relaxing the nonnegativity axiom leads
to an infinite number of quasi-probabilities consistent with the marginals. The
value of the minimum L1 probability norm is denoted M∗, and is mathematically
given by M∗ =
∑
ωi∈Ω |P ({ωi})|. This is a useful quantity, since P is a proper
probability (and therefore (Ω,F , P ) is a probability space) if and only if M∗ = 1
[35]. Furthermore, we can think of M∗ as a measure of contextuality: the larger its
value, the more contextual the system [82, 31].
Not all contextual systems allow for negative probabilities. For instance, in
references [1, 9, 82, 77] it was independently proven that negative probabilities
exist if and only if the marginals pi do not allow for direct influences (we called
such systems contextually biased in [34]). An example of a system that allows for
direct influences are the MZI and the double slit.
11A term coined in Reference [54].
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So, we see that negative probabilities are a possible extension of standard proba-
bility. It is not clear how this extension can be used to describe, in general, random
variables that are directly influenced by others. But, in some of the cases treated
in quantum cognition, it is possible, by reasoning in a counterfactual way as to
preserve the possibility of identifying random variables in different contexts (see
[33, 35] for a detailed analysis of the MZI with negative probabilities). But the
question remains as to whether negative probabilities provide any advantages over
other approaches.
Before we continue our exposition of negative probabilities, we should address
the issue of interpretation, which surely is being asked by many at this point. There
are many different ways to interpret negative probabilities, such as Khrennikov’s
quasi-stochastic p-adic processes [62, 63, 65], Abramsky and Brandembuerger’s neg-
ative and positive types [2], or Szekely’s square-root of a coin [108], to mention a
few. Here we take a more subjective (and pragmatic) approach, where negative
probabilities are seem as a computational device to help establishing truth values
to propositions (say, the proposition “the random variable A has value 1”). As
such, the minimization of the L1 norm is nothing but a requirement that this com-
putation should give us a quasi-probability distribution that is as close as possible
to a (non-existent) proper probability distribution. In other words, as Feynman and
Dirac, we see negative probabilities as a computational device, without necessarily
having a meaning.
We now turn to an example, first analyzed in [28], and based on the three ±1-
valued random variables X, Y, and Z. Imagine a decision maker, here named
Deanna, who wants to invest in the stocks of three companies, X, Y , and Z.
Knowing nothing about the stock market, Deanna hires three experts, Alice, Bob,
and Carlos, to give her advice. Their range of expertise overlaps, but are not the
same: Alice knows only about X and Y , but knows nothing about Z; Bob knows
about X and Z, but not about Y ; and Carlos knows about Y and Z, but not X.
All experts agree that the chances of X, Y , and Z going up are the same as them
going down. Alice also tells Deanna that she thinks that whenever X goes up, Y
is sure to go down, and vice versa. Bob tells her that whenever X goes one way, Z
goes the other way with probability 3/4, and they go the same way with probability
1/4. Finally, Carlos tells her that he sees no relationship whatsoever between Y
and Z. Associating a +1 value of a random variable with stock-values going up,
and −1 with going down, Deanna has the following expectations for X, Y, and Z.
(4.1) E (X) = E (Y) = E (Z) = 0,
(4.2) E (XY) = −1,
(4.3) E (XZ) = −1
2
,
and
(4.4) E (YZ) = 0.
It is not hard to see, using Suppes and Zanotti’s inequalities [107], that there is
no joint probability distribution for X, Y, and Z consistent with the expectations
(4.1)–(4.4).
How should Deanna proceed? There are some alternatives in the literature, but
perhaps the most common one would be the Bayesian approach, where Deanna
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starts with a prior probability distribution which is updated with the experts opin-
ions [79, 80]. However, as we pointed out elsewhere, this approach has problems.
First, the triple moment E (XYZ) is invariant under Bayesian updates of the pair-
wise moments. This means that whatever values of triple moments Deanna starts
with, those values are not updated [28]. This lack of update presents problems when
we expect Deanna to get information about the triple moment in cases where the
three experts agree. For instance, if Alice, Bob, and Carlos all say that the stocks
are perfectly correlated, Deanna’s update should lead to E (XYZ) = 1. Further-
more, for certain “inconsistent” (with a joint) correlations given by Alice, Bob,
and Carlos, weakening them would lead to a restricted value of the triple moment
[34]. But how to extract such information from the inconsistent beliefs given by
the experts? When a joint negative probability distribution is constructed, not any
distribution is allowed, but only those minimizing the L1 norm. We can show that,
for the above example, minimizing the L1 norm constrains the values of the triple
moment to be in the range
−1
4
≤ E (XYZ) ≤ 1
2
.
Therefore, negative probabilities provide information about the range of values of
the triple moment that is not part of the standard Bayesian update. With such
range, it should be possible, under certain conditions, to formulate a Dutch book.
5. Final Remarks
In this paper we examined different examples of contextuality in physics, namely
the double-slit experiment, in the form of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI),
the Bell-EPR entanglement experiment, and the Kochen-Specker theorem. We
argued that among those cases, the one that relates more closely to what is usually
done in quantum cognition is the MZI, and that both the Bell-EPR and the Kochen-
Specker paradigms have only marginal interest (from an empirical point of view).
We also discussed the restrictions on types of systems that can be modeled
by the Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics. Such formalism cannot
model certain systems that are not, in principle, forbidden by any cognitive or
behavioral principle. It also implies constraints such as the no-cloning theorem [39],
the no-signaling condition [88], and the monogamy of quantum correlations (from
entanglement) [92], to name a few cases. Such constraints are almost necessary for
Physical systems, or there would be severe conflicts with the (empirically verified)
theory of relativity, but they are not at all necessary for cognitive systems. In
fact, the Hilbert space formalism is so restrictive that it even forbids the simple
three-random-variable example we showed in Section 4.
With the examples presented, we are not attempting here to discourage the use
of the quantum formalism in cognition. We believe that the quantum mathemati-
cal structure inspired many interesting results in quantum cognition, and the large
volume of papers in the subject attest to its importance. Our goal is instead to
point out that there are other tools, such as negative probabilities, that should not
be neglected, and perhaps studied side-by-side with the quantum structures (this
is the subject of our other paper in this book [83]), and to challenge the quantum
interactions community to think about cases where the quantum formalism may be
inadequate or (at least) cumbersome. For instance, the examples we presented raise
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some questions about the quantum models. Can the (apparent) advantage of neg-
ative probabilities, in certain examples, over the Bayesian approach be reproduced
with the quantum formalism? What principles would have to be added to them?
Do human-decision makers follow a process similar to the minimization of the L1
norm for inconsistent situations? If so, how would such process be described in the
quantum formalism? Those are open questions that would need to be addressed.
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